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1  | INTRODUC TION
In the context of personnel selection, many companies are concerned 
that applicants distort their answers in self-assessment tools in 
order to increase their chances of getting hired (Christiansen, Rozek, 
& Burns, 2010; Hogan, Hogan, & Roberts, 1996). This behavior—
known as faking—is quite common in personality tests (e.g., Griffith, 
Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007; Tett, Freund, Christiansen, Fox, & 
Coaster, 2012) and job interviews (e.g., Levashina & Campion, 2007; 
Weiss & Feldman, 2006). To describe faking, other terms have been 
also used (response distortion, social desirability, impression man-
agement, and self-presentation), with faking likely to be the most 
prevalent term. Despite terminological differences, most people in 
the field will agree that faking should be understood as a contin-
uum and that there are individual differences between applicants in 
terms of actual faking behavior (e.g., König, Hafsteinsson, Jansen, & 
Stadelmann, 2011; Raymark & Tafero, 2009): Some applicants en-
gage in faking more than others, and these differences can lead to 
changes in the rank order of applicants. According to some authors, 
faking can therefore, negatively affect selection decisions (e.g., 
Donovan, Dwight, & Schneider, 2014; Peterson, Griffith, Isaacson, 
O’Connell, & Mangos, 2011), although this position is certainly not 
shared by everyone in the field (e.g., Hogan et al., 1996; König, 
Steiner Thommen, Steiner Thommen, Wittwer, & Kleinmann, 2017).
Due to the potentially problematic consequences of faking, 
research has repeatedly focused on this phenomenon, and the 
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Abstract
Recent research has highlighted competitive worldviews as a key predictor of faking—
the intentional distortion of answers by candidates in the selection context. According 
to theoretical assumptions, applicants’ abilities, and especially their cognitive abilities, 
should influence whether faking motivation, triggered by competitive worldviews, 
can be turned into successful faking behavior. Therefore, we examined the influence 
of competitive worldviews on faking in personality tests and investigated a possible 
moderation of this relationship by cognitive abilities in three independent high school 
and university student samples (N1 = 133, N2 = 137, N3 = 268). Our data showed nei-
ther an influence of the two variables nor of their interaction on faking behavior. We 
discuss possible reasons for these findings and give suggestions for further research.
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corresponding predictors, over several decades. One of the most re-
cent models stemming from this research field is the dynamic model 
of applicant faking (Roulin, Krings, & Binggeli, 2016), which high-
lights the effects of candidates’ perceptions and attitudes toward 
competition on their faking behavior. In addition to the predictors 
of faking already incorporated in previous theories, one of the cen-
tral assumptions is that applicants’ competitive worldviews influ-
ence their motivation to display an improved picture of themselves. 
In line with this idea, first empirical studies have shown substantial 
correlations between competitive worldviews and faking intentions, 
as well as resulting faking behavior in the context of job interviews 
(Bourdage, Roulin, & Tarraf, 2018; Roulin & Bourdage, 2017; Roulin & 
Krings, 2016; Schilling, Roulin, Obschonka, & König, 2020).
However, Roulin et al. (2016) line of argument is not limited to the 
interview context and should also be applicable to other selection 
tools. It is therefore important to test the generalizability of the model 
and the stability of the existing findings for other personnel selection 
procedures, such as standardized self-assessment tools. Personality 
tests are particularly suitable for such an evaluation, as they have been 
a focus of faking research for a long time (e.g., Bass, 1957). Moreover, 
meta-analytic research has indicated some very well-established find-
ings on faking in personality tests (e.g., Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, 
Brannick, & Smith, 2006; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999).
In addition, the dynamic model of applicant faking specifies an 
interaction between the motivational component of faking—as-
sociated with competitive worldviews—and the capacity required 
for successful faking, which has not been tested yet. In line with 
other faking theories (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Snell, Sydell, 
& Lueke, 1999), Roulin et al. (2016) assumed that motivation alone 
is not sufficient for successful faking. They argued that only if appli-
cants also have the abilities needed to distort their answers in the 
desired direction can motivation turn into actual faking.
Accordingly, the present study aimed to examine the dynamic 
model of faking proposed by Roulin et al. (2016) by testing central 
hypotheses of this model in the context of faking of personality 
tests. This study therefore extends previous research by investigat-
ing the effect of competitive worldviews on faking in the context of 
personality tests thereby also addressing the question of the gener-
alizability of previous research findings from job interviews. Using 
a within-subjects faking design (for an overview of different opera-
tionalizations of faking cf., Burns & Christiansen, 2011), we analyzed 
the corresponding relationships in three independent samples, using 
three different cognitive ability tests and two different operational-
izations of the competitive worldviews construct.
2  | THEORETIC AL BACKGROUND
2.1 | Competitive worldviews as a predictor of 
faking motivation and behavior
Originally conceptualized in the field of political psychology 
(Duckitt, 2001), competitive worldviews describe people's stable 
beliefs that the world is a competitive jungle, in which everyone is 
in a constant race for scarce resources (Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, 
& Birum, 2002). To succeed in such an environment, people with 
strong competitive worldviews are more prone to act ruthlessly 
at times and to do whatever it takes to get ahead. In this respect, 
competitive worldviews should be most relevant for behavior in 
situations characterized by competition for resources. With their 
dynamic model of applicant faking Roulin et al. (2016) were the first 
to introduce competitive worldviews in faking research. They argued 
that competition with others for a resource—in this specific case 
for a job—is particularly salient in selection situations. Their model 
suggests that people with strong competitive worldviews are more 
aware of the competition in the selection process, assume that the 
other candidates are doing everything possible to be selected, and 
are therefore, more motivated to do whatever it takes to get the job, 
including faking in interviews or standardized self-assessment tools.
In line with this argumentation, recent empirical studies showed 
a substantial relationship between applicants’ competitive world-
views and faking: Applicants with stronger competitive worldviews 
showed a higher motivation and intention to fake in a future job in-
terview (Roulin & Krings, 2016: r = .50) and also more self-reported 
faking behavior in past job interviews (Bourdage et al., 2018: r = . 
17–.20; Roulin & Bourdage, 2017: r = .22–.45; Roulin & Krings, 2016: 
r = .46). Following these empirical results, we expect similar effects 
for the domain of personality tests, that is, a positive relationship 
between competitive worldviews and faking. Persons with stron-
ger competitive worldviews should show more faking in personality 
tests (H1).
2.2 | The effect of cognitive abilities on (successful) 
faking behavior
Roulin et al. (2016) also assumed that successful faking requires not 
only the motivation to present oneself in an overly favorable way, but 
also the capacity to behave and answer accordingly. Applicants need 
to analyze the characteristics that are particularly important to a hiring 
organization—a task for which an applicant's ability to identify the (selec-
tion) criteria (ATIC: König, Melchers, Kleinmann, Richter, & Klehe, 2007) 
is a key factor. Following the argumentation behind ATIC, explicit and 
implicit cues about the requirements of a job can be interpreted differ-
ently well by applicants. In general, the correct interpretation of such 
cues should be easier for applicants if they possess more knowledge 
about the corresponding job. Research on ATIC has shown a direct ef-
fect on faking in various selection contexts (Klehe et al., 2012; König 
et al., 2007), but has also identified applicants’ cognitive abilities as a 
direct antecedent of this ability (Kleinmann et al., 2011). Indeed, ap-
plicants must anticipate the answers and behavior that an organization 
expects from qualified applicants and subsequently be able to demon-
strate such a behavior. According to Roulin et al. (2016), interpersonal 
skills play an important role for this task. Applicants with more pro-
nounced interpersonal skills should be better at interpreting situational 
cues in a selection situation and apply appropriate faking strategies 
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based on these cues. Moreover, meta-analytic findings indicated that 
interpersonal skills are also substantially related to cognitive abilities 
(Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004), and many authors do not consider 
them to be independent from cognitive abilities even on a theoretical 
level (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999).
Looking at faking in personality tests in particular, the analyt-
ical aspect is probably the most important part (Marcus, 2009), 
because responses to items do not have to be translated into sit-
uation-specific and complex interactional behavior, as it would be 
the case in job interviews (Levashina & Campion, 2006). The main 
challenge for an applicant filling out personality items is to deter-
mine whether a particular response captures a characteristic that a 
company would, to some extent, like to see in an applicant for that 
job. This primarily analytical task should be easier for applicants with 
higher cognitive abilities (Marcus, 2009). Previous empirical results 
testing this assumption have been inconclusive: While a substantial 
proportion of studies found a corresponding effect (e.g., Nguyen, 
Biderman, & McDaniel, 2005; Pauls & Crost, 2005; Underhill, 
Bearden, & Chen, 2008), others did not (Furnham, Taylor, & 
Chamorro-Premuzic, 2008; Levashina, Morgeson, & Campion, 2009; 
Mudgett, 2000). Nevertheless, first meta-analytic results (Schilling, 
Becker, Grabenhorst, & König, 2016) indicate more faking behavior 
among more intelligent individuals, especially in laboratory studies.
However, the dynamic model of applicant faking (Roulin 
et al., 2016) expects that the abilities listed above only come into 
play when applicants are motivated to fake. This suggests that the 
ability aspect of faking moderates the relationship between an ap-
plicant's faking motivation and the actual faking behavior, an as-
sumption that is also found in many previous faking theories (e.g., 
Ellingson & McFarland, 2011; Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland & 
Ryan, 2006). Therefore, considering competitive worldviews as a 
proxy for applicants’ motivation to distort responses to their ben-
efit, and cognitive abilities as a proxy for the ability to translate this 
motivation into successful faking, leads us to the hypothesis that 
cognitive abilities should moderate the relationship between com-
petitive worldviews and faking. Specifically, we expected a stronger 
relation between competitive worldviews and faking behavior with 
increasing cognitive abilities (H2).
3  | OVERVIE W OF STUDY
We tested our hypotheses on competitive worldviews and cogni-
tive abilities in three separate samples to validate the generaliz-
ability of our findings. In all three samples, we used a within-subject 
faking design, in which the participants completed a personality 
test once under an honesty condition and once under an applicant 
condition, a paradigm frequently used in previous research (Burns 
& Christiansen, 2011). As a measure for faking, and thus, as our de-
pendent variable, we used the change in the participants’ personal-
ity scores between the two conditions. Because simple difference 
scores are subject to important methodological problems (e.g., these 
values are always correlated with the components from which they 
were derived, i.e., with the personality of the participants), we used 
regression-adjusted difference scores (Burns & Christiansen, 2011). 
In this approach, the unstandardized residuals, left over from the 
prediction of the applicant personality scores by the honest per-
sonality scores, are used as indicators of individual faking behavior. 
Applicants’ faking scores, resulting from this procedure, are inde-
pendent of their underlying personality scores and possess better 
psychometric characteristics than simple difference scores (Burns & 
Christiansen, 2011). Finally, we tested our hypotheses using a regres-
sion analysis based on these regression-adjusted difference scores.
When selecting the samples, we focused on individuals who are 
at a point in their school or university education where applications 
are imminent. This entails two major advantages: First, such partic-
ipants are rather young and should have little experience with the 
application process. Therefore, prior experience should have less or 
no influence on the examined effects. Second, the task of applying 
for a job or an internship and participating in a selection process will 
come in the (near) future to these individuals. To conclude, our stud-
ies took place in a controlled environment with a convenience sam-
ple. To demonstrate the robustness of our results, we (a) used three 
different established methods to measure cognitive abilities and 
(b) measured competitive worldviews using two methods: once with 
the method established in the literature (Duckitt et al., 2002; Roulin 
& Krings, 2016) and once with a newly developed questionnaire.
Using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), we calcu-
lated N = 109 as the minimum sample size required, based on a main 
effect of r = .30 (the median effect size of the corresponding stud-
ies from the area of job interviews, Bourdage et al., 2018; Roulin & 
Bourdage, 2017; Roulin & Krings, 2016) and for a power of 1–β = .90. 
For the interaction effect, we refrained from calculating the required 
sample size, as there was no empirical data available at that time to esti-
mate the size of the corresponding effect. The ethics board of the par-
ticipating institutes has generally approved this type of study design for 
faking research, eliminating the need for a separate review of this study.
4  | SAMPLE 1
In our first sample, we looked at faking behavior in a personality test 
among psychology students who had to apply for an internship dur-
ing their second or third year of studies. The corresponding data col-
lection took place at a German university in the course of the first 
semester of the Bachelor's degree.
4.1 | Methods
4.1.1 | Sample and procedure
Data were collected at three time points during an obligatory intro-
ductory lecture on statistics and research methods in psychology 
at a mid-sized German university. At the first testing session, cogni-
tive abilities were measured. At the second testing session (4 weeks 
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later), we assessed competitive worldviews and personality under 
standard (honest) instructions. In the third test session (1 week after 
the second session), participants completed the personality test 
again, this time with instructions to do so as if they were applying 
for their mandatory internship. Therefore, they should imagine that 
they were in the process of applying for a very prestigious intern-
ship position and picture this situation as concretely as possible. 
Moreover, to further increase their involvement, participants were 
instructed to note down details of this situation (e.g., the challenges 
they expect to face during this internship). The participants were 
then presented with a letter from the fictitious company offering 
this internship. In the letter, the participants were thanked for their 
application and informed about the following selection process in-
cluding various selection tests. All of these efforts were undertaken 
to maximize participants’ engagement and to create a situation as 
close as possible to a real application situation.
Students’ informed consent was obtained prior to their participa-
tion. Students participated voluntarily and had the chance to receive 
credit points for their studies. In total, data were collected from 133 
persons who took part in all three testing sessions. The mean age 
was 21.24 years (SD = 3.29) and 81.95% were women.
4.2 | Measures
4.2.1 | Competitive worldviews
To measure competitive worldviews, we used the 20-item 
Competitive Jungle Social World View scale (Duckitt et al., 2002). 
Sample items are “It's a dog-eat-dog world where you have to be 
ruthless at times” or “Winning is not the first thing; it's the only 
thing.” Items are rated on a 5-point scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree. This scale has also been used in previous research 
on competitive worldviews in the context of faking and showed ad-
equate reliability (Cronbach's α = .92; Roulin & Krings, 2016). All 20 
items were translated from English into German by two independent 
translators. Based on the procedure of Douglas and Craig (2007), a 
collaborative translation approach was established after the inde-
pendent translation. All items were translated as literally as possi-
ble. Fixed English idioms were replaced by German equivalents; for 
example, the aforementioned “dog-eat-dog” item was translated to: 
“Wir leben in einer Welt des ‘Fressen-oder-gefressen-Werdens,’ in 
der man manchmal rücksichtslos sein muss.”
To check the validity of the translated scale, we assessed fur-
ther variables that are linked to competitive worldviews according to 
Duckitt's Dual Process Model (2001). In line with Duckitt's research, 
competitive worldviews should be positively related to social domi-
nance orientation, which captures a person's preference for hierar-
chical relationships between groups. In this realm, previous research 
has shown that people with stronger competitive worldviews also 
prefer the maintenance of hierarchical social systems (i.e., show a 
higher social dominance orientation). In addition, competitive worl-
dviews should be negatively related to Honesty-Humility, a factor 
of the HEXACO model of personality (Lee & Ashton, 2004), which 
measures a person's honesty, fairness, greed avoidance, and mod-
esty. These aspects should conflict with the behavior of people with 
strong competitive worldviews, who seek for their own advantage 
without regard for others.
Our data showed a significant positive relationship between 
participants’ (N = 133) scores on the translated competitive world-
views scale and their scores on the German version of the 16-item 
social dominance orientation scale (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & 
Malle, 1994; Six, Wolfrath, & Zick, 2001), r = .40, p < .01. Participants’ 
scores on the Honesty-Humility factor of the HEXACO-60 (Ashton 
& Lee, 2009) model of personality were significantly negatively re-
lated to their scores on the translated competitive worldviews scale, 
r = −.60, p < .01. Both of these correlations, as well as the good 
reliability of the scale (Cronbach's α = .84), indicate that the German 
version of the Competitive Jungle Social World View scale provides 
an adequate measurement of competitive worldviews.
4.2.2 | Cognitive ability
We used the short version of the Leistungsprüfsystem 2 (LPS-2K) 
(Kreuzpointner, 2013; Kreuzpointner, Lukesch, & Horn, 2013), which 
is based on Carroll’s (1997) intelligence theory. It measures a par-
ticipant's cognitive abilities, with one overall score covering the 
aspects of crystallized intelligence, fluid intelligence, visual percep-
tion as well as cognitive speed. The LPS-2K demonstrated positive 
psychometric characteristics in previous research (Kreuzpointner 
et al., 2013) and takes 30 min to complete.
4.2.3 | Faking
We used the procedure introduced in Overview of Study and calcu-
lated regression-adjusted difference scores to measure faking. As a 
personality test, we used the Big Five Inventory (BFI, see e.g., John, 
Naumann, & Soto, 2008) in the German version by Fell and König 
(2016) with 44 items. The BFI is an easy-to-use and robust test that 
measures the Big Five personality traits (Neuroticism, Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, Openness to Experience, and Conscientiousness; 
Lang, Lüdtke, & Asendorpf, 2001). Sample items are “I see myself as 
someone who makes plans and follows through with them” (consci-
entiousness) and “I see myself as someone who likes to reflect, play 
with ideas” (openness to experience). Items are rated on a 5-point 
scale from 1 = disagree strongly to 5 = agree strongly. For simplifi-
cation and better interpretation, Neuroticism was reverse-coded as 
Emotional Stability.
4.3 | Results
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for 
Sample 1. In line with the assumptions of our within-subject faking 
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paradigm, participants scored significantly higher in the applicant 
condition than in the honest condition for all five personality traits, 
t(132) = 3.10–10.84, p < .01. An overview of the effect sizes of the 
faking manipulation for all three samples in this study compared to 
meta-analytical results is presented in Table 1. The variances of the 
personality scores remained basically the same for both conditions, 
F(132, 132) = 1.02–1.16, p > .39. The faking effect sizes were in the 
range expected from meta-analytical results (Birkeland et al., 2006: 
dALL = .11–.44
1; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999: dALL = .47–.93). The 
mean level of competitive worldviews found in this sample (M = 1.96, 
SD = .44) corresponded to previous studies in the faking context 
(Bourdage et al., 2018: M = 2.21, SD = .51; Roulin & Bourdage, 2017: 
M = 2.15, SD = .54; Roulin & Krings, 2016: 2.24 ≤ M ≤ 2.39, .52 ≤ SD ≤ 
.58). The mean LPS-2K score (M = 95.62, SD = 16.21) was above 
that reported by the test authors (Kreuzpointner, 2013: M = 80.19, 
SD only reported on a subtest level) but was fairly similar to scores 
from other samples of psychology students (Schwabe, 2018: 
M = 102.64, SD = 21.07). As indicated by previous research (Sibley 
& Duckitt, 2009), we found high correlations between participants’ 
agreeableness and their competitive worldviews under the honest 
condition—and also under the applicant condition. In addition, the 
correlations between the personality scores under the two condi-
tions were rather high (r = .78–.89). In the course of calculating the 
regression-adjusted difference scores, the participants’ honest per-
sonality scores explained 61.3%–78.3% of the variance in their ap-
plicant personality scores.
Table 3 summarizes the results concerning our two hypotheses, 
tested separately for all five personality traits. The results did not 
show a significant main effect of competitive worldviews (pALL ≥ .20), 
or of cognitive abilities (pALL ≥ .08). Moreover, the interaction of 
the two predictors did not significantly affect candidates’ faking 
in the personality test for any of the personality traits (pALL ≥ .27). 
Therefore, both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 had to be rejected 
for Sample 1. In total, competitive worldviews, cognitive abilities 
and the corresponding interaction explained only a very small pro-
portion of the variance in the regression-adjusted difference scores 
(R2 = .003–.039). To further confirm the results, we (a) checked the 
influence of the control variables age and gender and (b) recalculated 
the models based on simple difference scores as used in some pre-
vious studies (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Peterson et al., 2011). 
Neither had any influence on the results regarding the hypotheses 
of this study (results available upon request from the first author).
4.4 | Discussion
Contrary to our assumptions based on previous research (Bourdage 
et al., 2018; Roulin & Bourdage, 2017; Roulin & Krings, 2016), we 
found neither an effect of competitive worldviews on faking behav-
ior nor a moderation of this relationship by the participants’ cogni-
tive abilities. Nevertheless, all other key parameters (e.g., the effect 
sizes for faking) indicated that our study design worked as expected.
Another noteworthy fact is that the correlations between partici-
pants’ personality scores under the honest and the applicant condition 
were in the range that could be expected from previous research with 
similar study designs, but rather in upper part of the distribution (e.g., 
compared to Biderman & Nguyen, 2009: rALL = .69–.85; Christiansen, 
Burns, & Montgomery, 2005: rC,E = .18–.34; Griffith et al., 2007: 
rC = .50; Peterson et al., 2011: rC = .62) and reached or even exceeded 
ranges assumed as test–retest reliability (Gnambs, 2014: pALL =. 
80–.83; Viswesvaran & Ones, 2000: pALL = .73–.78). Despite this, we 
found a significant mean shift between the honest and applicant con-
dition for all five personality traits: In combination with the statistical 
argument2 that the interpersonal variance in faking is automatically 
negatively related to the correlation between the two conditions, it fol-
lows that most participants seem to have distorted their responses in 
a similar way. Accordingly, the shift in rank order of participants due to 
faking was negligible. This partially contradicts the results of previous 
research, which gave clear evidence of strong interindividual differ-
ences in faking behavior and of a negative effect of faking on the con-
sistency of personality measurement (e.g., Raymark & Tafero, 2009; 
Salgado, 2016).
TA B L E  1   Effect size of the faking manipulation in the three samples compared to meta-analytical results
Effect size in current study
Meta-analytical results
Within-subject studies Between-subject studies
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
Viswesvaran and Ones 
(1999)
Viswesvaran and Ones 
(1999) Birkeland et al. (2006)
d d d Mean d CI 90% Mean d CI 90% Mean d CI 95%
Conscientiousness .89 .80 .48 .89 .14–1.63 .60 .29–.92 .45 .30–.59
Emotional stability .94 .68 .53 .93 .31–1.54 .64 .44–.85 .44 .28–.59
Agreeableness .56 .37 .25 .47 .18–.76 .48 .10–.85 .16 −.01 to .32
Extraversion .66 .52 .29 .54 −.19 to 1.26 .63 .33–.93 .11 .01–.22
Openness to 
experience
.27 .52 .13 .76 −.25 to 1.78 .65 −.11 to 1.41 .13 .01–.24
Notes: Sample 1 N = 133, Sample 2 N = 137, Sample 3 N = 268.
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An explanation for our findings may be that participants in this 
particular sample had already acquired some knowledge about the 
psychological concept of personality and how personality question-
naires are scored (which might affect faking, König, Jansen, Jansen, 
& Lüscher Mathieu, 2017). This might have led participants to be-
have similarly, as they also had a shared idea of how to respond suc-
cessfully to a personality test in a selection situation. To rule out 
such an explanation, we decided to replicate our study with a second 
academic sample without such knowledge.
5  | SAMPLE 2
In our second sample, we looked at faking behavior in a person-
ality test among German university students of a teacher train-
ing program. In Germany, teacher training studies at a university 
last for at least 4.5 years and are followed by a practical part of 
teacher training, which usually lasts between 18 and 24 months 
(“Lehramtsreferendariat” in German). In German-speaking coun-
tries, there is a growing call to replace the current selection practice 
for teaching positions, which is often solely based on grades, with a 
system that places a stronger focus on appropriate individual char-
acteristics for the teaching profession. Students in teacher training 
programs, like those in this sample, might also encounter selection 
instruments like personality tests in the future when applying for the 
practical part of their teacher training.
5.1 | Methods
5.1.1 | Sample and procedure
Data were collected at two time points during an obligatory intro-
ductory lecture on educational assessment for sophomore teacher 
students at a mid-sized German university. At the first testing session 
that took place during the first session of the lecture, we measured 
cognitive abilities. At the second testing session (4 weeks later), we 
measured competitive worldviews and the participants completed a 
similar within-person faking paradigm as in Sample 1. The scenario 
was adapted to the study program, and therefore, focused on an ap-
plication for the practical part of teacher training rather than an ap-
plication for an internship. Students’ informed consent was obtained 
prior to their participation. Students participated voluntarily and had 
the chance to received course credit. In total, data were collected 
from 137 persons who took part in both testing sessions. The mean 
age was 23.16 years (SD = 5.21) and 78.10% were women.
5.2 | Measures
5.2.1 | Competitive worldviews
The same German-language 20-item Competitive Jungle Social 
World View scale was used as in Study 1.
5.2.2 | Cognitive ability
To measure participants’ cognitive abilities, we used the Intelligenz-
Struktur-Test-Screening (IST-Screening: Liepmann, Beauducel, 
Brocke, & Nettelnstroth, 2012), a short version of the well- 
established Intelligence-Structure-Test 2000 R (I-S-T 2000 R; 
Liepmann et al., 2007). The IST-Screening is based on Thurstone’s 
(1938) and Cattell’s (1963) intelligence theories and measures ver-
bal, numerical, and figural reasoning abilities with 20 items each 
(Liepmann et al., 2012). The overall score on the three ability facets 
indicates general reasoning ability, which is a good proxy for people's 
cognitive abilities (Guttman & Levy, 1991). The test authors have 
TA B L E  3   Regression models for faking on the five personality traits in Sample 1
Predictors
Δ Conscientiousness Δ Emotional stability Δ Agreeableness Δ Extraversion Δ Openness to Exp.
b p b p b p b p b p
(Intercept) .00 .91 .00 .91 .00 .96 .00 .92 .00 .97
(−.06 to .06) (−.07 to .06) (−.05 to .05) (−.04 to .05) (−.05 to .05)
CWs −.09 .20 .05 .49 −.03 .66 −.02 .68 .04 .48
(−.23 to .05) (−.10 to .20) (−.14 to .09) (−.13 to .09) (−.07 to .16)
Cogn. abil. −.00 .78 .00 .91 .00 .99 −.00 .08 −.00 .47
(−.00 to .00) (−.00 to .00) (−.00 to .00) (−.01 to .00) (−.00 to .00)
IA −.01 .27 −.01 .27 −.00 .66 .00 .31 .00 .72
(−.01 to .00) (−.01 to .00) (−.01 to .01) (−.00 to .01) (−.01 to .01)
R2 .019 .016 .003 .039 .010
Notes: Δ = Faking for the corresponding personality trait, measured as regression-adjusted difference score. Openness to Exp. = Openness to 
Experience; CWs = competitive worldviews; Cogn. abil. = cognitive abilities (measured with the Leistungsprüfsystem-2 Kurzversion LPS-2K). 
IA = Interaction between competitive worldviews and cognitive abilities. All predictors were centered to enhance interpretability of the results. 
Confidence intervals (95%) are given in brackets below the corresponding b's (the unstandardized regression weights). N = 133.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































272  |     SCHILLING et aL.
reported good convergent and discriminant validity coefficients 
as well as adequate internal consistencies (α = .87–.90; Liepmann 
et al., 2012).
5.2.3 | Faking
We used the same approach and personality test (Big Five Inventory: 
Fell & König, 2016) as in Sample 1 to measure faking. Due to organi-
zational constraints, both conditions of the personality test had to 
be completed in one test session. Therefore, we varied the order 
of the conditions randomly between the participants in order to 
exclude any confounding effects. Faking scores were calculated as 
regression-adjusted difference scores between the two conditions 
of the personality test.
5.3 | Results
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for 
Sample 2. In line with the intended experimental manipulation, 
participants showed significantly higher personality scores in 
the applicant condition than in the honest condition, d = .37–.80, 
t(136) = 6.07–9.32, p < .01 (see Table 1 for a comparison of these 
effect sizes with meta-analytical results). The variances of the per-
sonality scores remained basically the same for both conditions, 
F(136, 136) = 1.08–1.28; p > .15. Corresponding effect sizes were 
again in the range of previous research results (e.g., Birkeland 
et al., 2006; Hooper, 2007; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999; see results 
section of Sample 1). The competitive worldviews scores (M = 1.90, 
SD = .39) were also comparable to previous studies (e.g., Bourdage 
et al., 2018; Roulin & Bourdage, 2017; Roulin & Krings, 2016; see re-
sults section of Sample 1) and the mean IST-Screening score matched 
the standard values of the test manual for this age and educational 
group (M = 46.59, SD = 4.82 [21–25 years, with university entrance-
level qualifications]; Liepmann et al., 2012). In accordance with pre-
vious research (Sibley & Duckitt, 2009), we found a high negative 
correlation between participants’ agreeableness and their competi-
tive worldviews, under both the honest and the applicant condition 
(rHonest condition = −.52, rApplicant condition = −.48). In this sample, the cor-
relations between the personality scores under the two conditions 
were rather high (r = .79–.91); correspondingly, the honest personal-
ity scores of the participants explained 61.8%–80.5% of the variance 
in their applicant scores.
Table 5 summarizes the results regarding our two hypothe-
ses, tested separately for all five personality traits. The results 
did not show a significant main effect of competitive worldviews 
(pALL > .20), or of cognitive abilities (pALL > .18). Moreover, the in-
teraction of the two predictors did not significantly affect candi-
dates’ faking in the personality test for any of the personality traits 
(pALL > .12). Therefore, both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 were 
rejected for Sample 2. Overall, competitive worldviews, cognitive 
abilities and the corresponding interaction explained only a very 
small proportion of the variance in the regression-adjusted differ-
ence scores (R2 = .011–.028). These results were also robust when 
faking scores were calculated based on simple difference scores or 
when results were controlled for further influencing variables (age, 
gender).
5.4 | Discussion
Similar to the results in Sample 1, we found neither the assumed 
effect of competitive worldviews on faking behavior nor a mod-
eration of this relationship by the participants’ cognitive abilities. 
Overall, we found exactly the same pattern of results as in Sample 1. 
Additionally, the correlations between the participants’ personality 
scores under the honest condition and under the applicant condition 
TA B L E  5   Regression models for faking on the five personality traits in Sample 2
Predictors
Δ Conscientiousness Δ Emotional stability Δ Agreeableness Δ Extraversion Δ Openness to Exp.
b p b p b p b p b p
(Intercept) .00 .98 .00 .98 .00 .99 .00 .97 .00 .97
(−.05 to .05) (−.07 to .07) (−.05 to .05) (−.05 to .04) (−.04 to .04)
CWs .02 .78 −.02 .79 −.08 .20 .02 .75 .06 .31
(−.12 to .15) (−.19 to .15) (−.20 to .04) (−.10 to .14) (−.05 to .16)
Cogn. abil. .00 .38 .01 .34 −.00 .99 .01 .18 −.00 .87
(−.01 to .02) (−.01 to .02) (−.01 to .01) (−.00 to .02) (−.01 to .01)
IA −.01 .34 −.01 .44 .01 .62 −.02 .12 −.02 .16
(−.04 to .01) (−.05 to .02) (−.02 to .03) (−.05 to .01) (−.04 to .01)
R2 .011 .011 .014 .028 .023
Notes: Δ = Faking for the corresponding personality trait, measured as regression-adjusted difference score. Openness to Exp. = Openness to 
Experience; CWs = competitive worldviews; Cogn. abil. = cognitive abilities (measured with the Intelligenz-Struktur-Test-Screening); IA = Interaction 
between competitive worldviews and cognitive abilities. All predictors were centered to enhance interpretability of the results. Confidence intervals 
(95%) are given in brackets below the corresponding b's (the unstandardized regression weights). N = 137.
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were comparable to Sample 1. As such, it is therefore unlikely that 
Sample 1 participants’ knowledge about personality as a psychologi-
cal construct and its assessment was the reason for the lack of effects 
associated with interindividual variations in faking. Taken together, 
the results of these two samples raise questions about the general-
izability of findings concerning competitive worldviews (Bourdage 
et al., 2018; Roulin & Bourdage, 2017; Roulin & Krings, 2016) as well 
as a moderation effect of cognitive abilities (Roulin et al., 2016).
Another possible explanation for the lack of interindividual vari-
ance of faking might lie in the limitation to a sample consisting solely 
of university students and the associated indirect variance restric-
tion due to admission requirements. To rule out this alternative ex-
planation, we decided to repeat our study with a third, nonacademic, 
sample without such restrictions.
6  | SAMPLE 3
In our third sample, we focused on a relatively diverse group of 
school pupils shortly before graduation. The participants came from 
different tracks of secondary school, with graduation after 9, 10, or 
12 years (lower track, medium track, and higher track, respectively). 
The data were collected as part of an application training course or-
ganized in cooperation with the Ministry of Education of a German 
Federal state. After graduation, pupils in Germany usually apply for 
an apprenticeship training position, a university place, or directly for 
a job in a company. In the course of the corresponding selection pro-
cedures, both companies and universities are increasingly using psy-
chometric selection methods, including personality tests (Diekmann 
& König, 2015; Schuler, Hell, Trapmann, Schaar, & Boramir, 2007).
6.1 | Methods
6.1.1 | Sample and procedure
Data were collected as part of an optional application training course, 
which was offered to pupils in preparation for future selection pro-
cedures. One week before the actual training, pupils filled out a 
questionnaire assessing competitive worldviews, Honesty-Humility, 
and personality under honest instructions. The application training 
itself was designed to reflect a real selection situation. After a brief 
introduction, the coaches played the role of human resource employ-
ees of a fictitious company. As part of a cover story, the pupils were 
told to imagine that they had applied for a job with this company 
and were now taking part in a selection process. During this training 
session, we measured cognitive abilities and participants completed 
the personality test again, this time with instructions to do so as if 
they were applying for the job specified in the cover story. Pupils’ 
and their legal guardians’ informed consent was obtained prior to 
their participation. Pupils did not receive any further compensa-
tion for their participation. In total, complete data were collected 
from 268 participants. The mean age was 16.66 years (SD = 1.27), 
54.48% were women and the participants were between their 8th 
and 11th year of school education. The specific training course was 
conducted at six different secondary schools, with 25.37% of the 
participants attending a lower-track school, 16.04% a medium-track 
school, and 58.59% a higher-track school.
6.2 | Measures
6.2.1 | Competitive worldviews
For organizational reasons and due to the distinctive nature of this 
sample, we did not use the Competitive Jungle Social World View 
scale in Sample 3. In particular, subject matter experts recom-
mended against such a long (20 items with an average of 18 words 
per item) and linguistically demanding scale in this broad educational 
context. Therefore, we developed a short scale on competitive 
worldviews, which should capture the aspects underlying the con-
struct (Darwinistic attitude, Social Dominance Orientation, Tough 
Mindedness, Machiavellianism; Duckitt et al., 2002) while being 
more comprehensible and appropriate for the time constraints in 
this sample. The main goal was not to reduce the Competitive Jungle 
Social World View scale to a manageable size, but rather to develop a 
new operationalization from scratch that focuses on content validity.
Based on the definition of competitive worldviews (Duckitt 
et al., 2002), we created a pool with 15 linguistically simple and short 
items. As in the original scale, all items were formulated according to 
the principle of indirect questioning (e.g., Fisher, 1993)—this means 
that they did not refer to the persons themselves but to the popula-
tion in general—in order to lower socially desirable response tenden-
cies. These 15 items were evaluated by five subject matter experts 
(four with a PhD in psychology and one with a Master degree in 
psychology) regarding their understandability. These 15 items were 
judged as well-formulated. An initial sample of German psychology 
students (N = 58) filled out this 15-item version plus the original 
Competitive Jungle Social World View scale (Duckitt et al., 2002) in 
its German translation. These data were used to further reduce the 
scale by choosing the eight items with the highest correlation with 
the original scale and by simultaneously ensuring that the new scale 
still covered all four aspects of competitive worldview (Darwinistic 
attitude, social dominance orientation, tough mindedness, and 
Machiavellianism). Sample items are: “Most people think that their 
own success is the only thing that really matters in life” and “Most 
people are willing to manipulate others to achieve their goals.” Items 
were rated on a 5-point scale from 1 = disagree strongly to 5 = agree 
strongly. An overview of the final eight German items as well as an 
English translation can be found in Appendix Table A1. In this sam-
ple, the final 8-item competitive worldviews short scale showed an 
acceptable reliability (Cronbach's α = .77).
In a further step, the competitive worldviews short scale was 
filled out by a sample of university students of a teacher training 
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program (N = 143; independent sample of Sample 2 of this study) 
to examine the factorial structure of the scale. After checking sam-
pling adequacy (KMO = .87; meritorious according to Hutcheson & 
Sofroniou, 1999) a principal axis factor analysis was conducted with 
the eight items and showed a single-factor structure (determined by 
parallel analysis; O’Connor, 2000) that explained 42.1% of the total 
variance. Seven out of the eight items had factor loadings on the 
factor between .61 and .80; one item had a factor loading of .38. In 
this sample, the competitive worldviews short scale achieved good 
reliability (Cronbach's α = .85).
The competitive worldviews short scale was then tested in an-
other validation sample (N = 76) consisting mainly of school pupils 
and university students in their first semester, again showing a good 
reliability estimate (Cronbach's α = .82). In addition to the short 
scale, the participants completed the German version of the social 
dominance orientation scale (Pratto et al., 1994; Six et al., 2001) and 
the Honesty-Humility scale from HEXACO-60 (Ashton & Lee, 2009) 
as well as the German translation of the Competitive Jungle Social 
World View scale (Duckitt et al., 2002), all of which were used in 
Sample 1. In this sample, both scales measuring competitive worl-
dviews showed similar uncorrected correlations with social domi-
nance orientation (original scale r = .51, p < .01 vs. short scale r = .40, 
p < .01) as well as a concurrent relationship to Honesty-Humility 
(original scale r = −.54, p < .01 vs. short scale r = −.27, p < .05). Scores 
of the original and the short scale correlated considerably (r = .40, 
p < .01).
In conclusion, the newly developed 8-item competitive world-
views short scale meets the objective of reducing the required re-
sponse time (median response time: original scale = 212 s in total, 
short scale = 52 s in total) and the main objective of being linguis-
tically adequate for pupils’ samples as well as university students 
samples. To conclude, this short scale provides an adequate mea-
surement of competitive worldviews especially in relation to the 
definition of the construct.
6.2.2 | Cognitive ability
We used a German translation of the English Wonderlic Personnel 
Test Form A (Wonderlic, 1996), which has already been used multi-
ple times in research contexts (e.g., Albrecht, Paulus, Dilchert, Deller, 
& Ones, 2013). The Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT) is a short-form 
cognitive ability test developed to measure a person's cognitive abil-
ities (Wonderlic & Hovland, 1939). The WPT consists of 50 items 
from the areas of mathematics, reasoning as well as vocabulary and 
has a strict time limit of 12 min (Wonderlic & Hovland, 1939). The 
WPT has demonstrated good psychometric properties, for instance 
an excellent test–retest reliability of .94 over a period of 5 years 
(Dodrill, 1983) as well as considerable convergent validity (r = .61 
with other measurements of general mental ability) when used in 
student samples (Leverett, Matthews, Lassiter, & Bell, 2001). Besides 
that, the WPT is one of the most commonly used intelligence tests in 
both research and personnel selection (e.g., Super, 2006).
6.2.3 | Faking
We used the same approach as in Sample 1 and 2 to measure fak-
ing. Due to time constraints, we replaced the BFI with the corre-
sponding short form of the Big Five Inventory (BFI-K: Rammstedt & 
John, 2005). The BFI-K measures the same five personality traits as 
the BFI with 21 instead of 44 items. Despite the short test length, 
the BFI-K has demonstrated fairly acceptable reliability (Cronbach's 
α = .64–.86) and similar validity compared to the longer test version 
in previous research (Rammstedt & John, 2005).
6.3 | Results
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for 
Sample 3. We found a significant faking effect for all five personality 
traits, d = .13–.53, t(267) = 2.10–8.67, p < .05 (see Table 1 for a com-
parison of these effect sizes with meta-analytical results). The vari-
ances of the personality scores remained basically the same for both 
conditions, F(267, 267) = 1.00–1.27; p > .05. Corresponding effect 
sizes were in the lower range of previous research results (Birkeland 
et al., 2006; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). The mean score on the 
WPT (M = 23.15, SD = 6.88) corresponded to that from other studies 
in the educational context (M = 26.7; McKelvie, 1989). In Sample 3, 
we also found significant correlations between participants’ agreea-
bleness and their competitive worldviews in both conditions, al-
though lower than in the other two samples (rHonest condition = −.31 and 
rApplicant condition = −.12 in Sample 3 compared to rHonest condition = −.57 and 
rApplicant condition = −.49 in Sample 1 and rHonest condition = −.52 
and rApplicant condition = −.48 in Sample 2, all differences significant a 
p < .01, when compared with independent sample tests). In addition, 
participants’ cognitive abilities, measured with the WPT, were signif-
icantly correlated with their competitive worldviews scores (r = .28). 
Overall, the correlations between the personality scores under the 
two conditions were high (r = .47–.63) and the honest personality 
scores of the participants explained 24.1%–43.6% of the variance in 
their applicant scores.
Table 7 summarizes the results concerning our two hypoth-
eses, tested separately for all five personality traits. Our results 
showed no main effect of competitive worldviews on applicants’ 
faking for four of the five personality traits (pC, ES, A, O > .40). The 
results suggested a significant effect of competitive worldviews 
(b = .13, p < .05) on participants’ faking behavior for Extraversion. 
Participants with stronger competitive worldviews seem to show 
a greater tendency for faking with respect to the personality trait 
extraversion. However, considering the large number of individual 
tests carried out so far, this single significant effect only supports the 
corresponding Hypothesis 1 to an insufficient degree. If the signifi-
cance level is adjusted for multiple testing (e.g., by Holm–Bonferroni 
method: Holm, 1979), the effect of competitive worldviews does not 
reach significance. There were also significant main effects of par-
ticipants’ cognitive abilities on faking of Emotional Stability (b = .01, 
p < .05) and faking of Extraversion (b = .01, p < .05), which both 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































276  |     SCHILLING et aL.
disappeared when corrected for multiple testing. The interaction of 
the two predictors also did not significantly affect candidates’ faking 
in the personality test for any of the personality traits (pALL > .12). In 
conclusion, both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 can be considered 
as rejected for Sample 3. Competitive worldviews, cognitive abilities 
and the corresponding interaction only explained a very small pro-
portion of the variance in the regression-adjusted difference scores 
(R2 = .002–.051). The results from Sample 3 were also robust when 
faking scores were calculated based on simple difference scores, 
when results were controlled for further influencing variables (age, 
gender), and when a potential multilevel structure of schools and 
classes was taken into account.
6.4 | Discussion
As in the previous samples, we did not find any systematic evidence 
for our two hypotheses in this third group. Moreover, we did not find 
the effect of competitive worldviews on faking behavior reported 
in previous studies in the interview context (Bourdage et al., 2018; 
Roulin & Bourdage, 2017; Roulin & Krings, 2016), and this relation-
ship was not moderated by the participants’ cognitive abilities. Again, 
all remaining key parameters (e.g., the effect sizes for faking) indi-
cated that the study design worked as expected (Roulin et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, Sample 3 represents a broad cross section due to a 
larger age cohort, is fairly gender-balanced, and does not focus on 
a sample of academic students. We can therefore essentially rule 
out homogeneity of the participants and the associated restriction 
of variances as reasons for the insignificant results in the current 
study. Overall, the findings for this third sample support the conclu-
sion that competitive worldviews are not as important for faking in 
personality tests as they are in the context of interviews. Moreover, 
cognitive abilities do not act as a moderator for this nonexistent re-
lationship. In the general discussion, we discuss possible reasons for 
these findings and their consequences.
7  | GENER AL DISCUSSION
7.1 | Contribution to theory
In response to calls from the authors of the dynamic model of faking 
behavior (Roulin et al., 2016), the present study investigated the mo-
tivational influence of competitive worldviews in conjunction with 
cognitive abilities as an aspect of the capacity to fake for the first 
time in the area of personality assessment. Contrary to our expecta-
tions fueled by the results of job interview research, we found that 
the results regarding the relationship between competitive world-
views and interview faking do not automatically generalize to per-
sonality assessment. In none of our three samples did we find any 
reliable evidence that competitive worldviews affected faking on 
any of the five personality dimensions examined, and our results did 
not suggest a moderating effect of cognitive abilities. At this point, it 
should be noted that due to our approach with three different sam-
ples and the considerable sample sizes, test power problems should 
be largely ruled out as the cause for this unexpected outcome. 
Furthermore, we employed different and carefully validated meth-
ods in all three samples to assess competitive worldviews and cogni-
tive abilities, which makes it rather unlikely that our study results can 
be attributed to problems in the assessment of competitive world-
views and cognitive abilities. In the light of our findings, we would 
like to present two potential explanations in the next paragraphs, 
TA B L E  7   Regression models for faking on the five personality traits in Sample 3
Predictors
Δ Conscientiousness Δ Emotional stability Δ Agreeableness Δ Extraversion
Δ Openness to 
Exp.
b p b p b p b p b p
(Intercept) −.01 .89 −.02 .67 .00 .99 −.02 .67 .01 .86
(−.07 to .06) (−.09 to .06) (−.08 to .08) (−.09 to .06) (−.07 to .08)
CWs .04 .40 −.02 .72 .02 .77 .13 .02 .03 .56
(−.06 to .15) (−.13 to .09) (−.10 to .13) (.02 to .24) (−.08 to .15)
Cogn. abil. .01 .12 .01 .03 .00 .65 .01 .04 .01 .09
(−.00 to .02) (.00 to .02) (−.01 to .01) (.00 to .02) (−.00 to .02)
IA .00 .60 .01 .12 −.00 .95 .01 .12 −.01 .52
(−.01 to .02) (−.00 to .03) (−.02 to .02) (−.00 to .03) (−.02 to .01)
R2 .016 .024 .002 .051 .020
Notes: Δ = Faking for the corresponding personality trait, measured as regression-adjusted difference score. Openness to Exp. = Openness to 
Experience; CWs = competitive worldviews; Cogn. abil. = cognitive abilities (measured with the Leistungsprüfsystem-2 Kurzversion LPS-2K). 
IA = Interaction between competitive worldviews and cognitive abilities. All predictors were centered to enhance interpretability of the results. 
Confidence intervals (95%) are given in brackets below the corresponding b's (the unstandardized regression weights). N = 268. p values below the 
5% criterion are printed in bold.
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which in turn may have very different implications for the canon of 
faking research.
In the simplest case, the results regarding competitive world-
views from the domain of job interviews may not be generalizable 
to personality assessment because applicants might perceive com-
petition in the two selection situations differently. With regard to 
personality tests, organizations often invite applicants for many dif-
ferent positions to attend large group tests, or the procedure even 
takes place completely online. Here, the competitive situation is 
more like a school exam, in which the objective is to prove one’s own 
suitability, rather than a fight between applicants. However, once 
applicants have made it to the job interview stage, it may become 
clearer that it is now a matter of competing directly with others who 
have also made it this far. However, as pointed out by an anonymous 
reviewer, such a perception by candidates would not be an errone-
ous assumption on behalf of applicants. The proportion of individu-
als who pass a personality test is typically much smaller than those 
who pass an interview (e.g., large multinational corporation only pass 
5%–10% of applicants from the stage of a standardized assessment 
to the interview phase, but then interview 3–4 candidates for a job 
and hire one). In fact, the testing situation in personality assessment 
is actually much more competitive. As argued by Roulin and Krings 
(2016, p. 646), “competitive worldviews are particularly influential 
when competition with others is salient.” We may therefore not have 
been able to reproduce the results from the interview context be-
cause competition with others may not be as salient in personality 
tests as in job interviews. Accordingly, competitive worldviews may 
have different effects on faking motivation and faking behavior in 
these two types of selection procedure: (a) selection procedures 
in which applicants interact directly with each other (i.e., in which 
the competitors are directly obvious) and (b) selection procedures 
in which it is clear to applicants that they only have to compete with 
a small number of equally qualified others (i.e., at the end of a mul-
tilevel selection process). In general, this argument also implies that 
the assumptions regarding competitive worldviews in the dynamic 
model of applicant faking (Roulin et al., 2016) may fit better with 
some types of selection procedure than with others.
A different explanation may lie in the differences in study design. 
Our study examined faking using a laboratory-based within-subject 
faking design for all three samples—a design which is widely used in 
current faking research (Burns & Christiansen, 2011)—whereas stud-
ies in the context of job interviews focused on self-reports of faking 
intention or previous faking behavior (e.g., Roulin & Krings, 2016). 
However, the within-subject faking paradigm, in which participants 
complete a personality test under different instructions, is not with-
out criticism. Ones, Viswesvaran, and Reiss (1996), for example, 
pointed out that the mental processes underlying the completion of a 
personality test might differ between laboratory and field situations. 
Corresponding empirical evidence can be seen in the different effect 
sizes (Birkeland et al., 2006; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999), as well as 
in discrepancies between the two research approaches regarding 
the construct validity of personality tests (Schilling et al., 2016). In 
all three of our samples, we found significant faking effects insofar 
as the participants achieved higher personality scores in the appli-
cant conditions (see Table 1) and also the ratios in standard devia-
tion between honest and applicant condition (often called u-values) 
were higher but approached the range observed in meta-analytical 
results (Salgado, 2016). However, in all samples, we also found high 
to very high correlations between the personality scores of the two 
conditions (r = .47–.91)—lying in the range of what could be expected 
from previous research, but in the upper part of the distribution. In 
contrast to previous research (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Raymark 
& Tafero, 2009), these findings in particular indicate that there was 
rather little variance in the faking of our participants and that all of 
them seem to have distorted their scores to a similar degree. Based 
on the assumption that faking behavior is the product of a motiva-
tional and an ability component (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Roulin 
et al., 2016), such a uniform faking effect could be interpreted as sug-
gesting that there were few individual differences between our par-
ticipants in these two components. In our opinion, the manipulation 
through instruction or cover story in such a laboratory setting could 
lead to an equally strong faking motivation in all participants, regard-
less of the individual antecedents of this motivational aspect of faking. 
In line with this idea, it might be unsurprising that we were unable to 
find any effect of competitive worldviews in this specific setting.
Both presented explanations assume that motivational dif-
ferences between the participants played only a minor role in our 
specific study. According to the proposed relationship between mo-
tivation and ability (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Roulin et al., 2016; 
Snell et al., 1999), cognitive abilities should then be the main predic-
tor of faking behavior in this case. However, we found this direct 
effect of cognitive abilities only in the third sample, where it only 
emerged for two of the five dimensions. This may be due to the fact 
that faking in a personality test with single-stimulus items, as used 
in this study, may only require a minimum level of cognitive ability. 
If applicants possess a minimum level of ability to identify what the 
socially desired answers to the items in such a personality question-
naire are, there might not be any additional benefits of cognitive 
abilities for faking behavior. In our opinion, the effect of cognitive 
abilities on faking behavior might, therefore, be more pronounced 
in self-assessment tools where faking is more cognitively challeng-
ing, such as forced-choice personality tests (Schilling et al., 2016; 
Vasilopoulos, Cucina, Dyomina, Morewitz, & Reilly, 2006).
7.2 | Future research directions
The two theoretical ideas mentioned above give rise to concrete 
suggestions for further research. If selection procedures differ in the 
extent to which applicants perceive competition among each other, 
future research should look at the relationship between competitive 
worldviews and faking selection procedures in which competition 
between applicants is more or less salient. For example, assessment 
centers could be of particular interest for research, since they are 
usually only carried out with applicants who have reached a short-
list, and also involve direct interaction between applicants. In such 
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situations, we would expect even higher effects of competitive 
worldviews on faking than in interviews.
Following our second line of argument, our findings support the 
idea put forward by Ones et al. (1996) that the processes in appli-
cants’ minds are not the same in a laboratory situation as they are 
in a real application situation. This might be especially problematic 
considering that many of the findings from faking research are based 
on such within-subject designs (e.g., van Hooft & Born, 2012; Pelt, 
van der Linden, & Born, 2018; Tett et al., 2012), while the distinct 
motivational character of these designs might limit the transfer-
ability of corresponding results to real-life faking. Therefore, in our 
opinion, it might be a good strategy for further faking researchers to 
focus more on approaches with real applicants and on real applica-
tion situations. Due to the practical difficulties involved, it may also 
be useful to refer to applicants’ self-reported behavior during past 
selection situations, as was done recently in the context of job inter-
views (Bourdage et al., 2018; Roulin & Krings, 2016).
In addition, further research should shed more light on the psy-
chometric differences between laboratory and field studies (for 
instance regarding correlations and u-values between honest and 
applicant conditions) and examine the effect of different faking ma-
nipulations. This could not only help to evaluate the transferability of 
previous research results, but also facilitate the design of laboratory 
studies that reflect best the faking of real applicants.
Furthermore, validation of the findings for forced-choice test, 
which can be considered as fairly robust against faking seems nec-
essary (Cao & Drasgow, 2019; Martin, Bowen, & Hunt, 2002). Since 
it should be more difficult to answer in a socially desirable manner, 
if one item includes two equally desirable dimensions (Vasilopoulos 
et al., 2006), the participants’ cognitive abilities could have a stron-
ger effect on faking for this type of personality tests. In this context, 
an additional measurement or manipulation of applicants’ cognitive 
loads might bring further important insights into the relationship be-
tween cognitive abilities and faking.
7.3 | Implications for personnel selection
Understandably, every organization that has to select applicants 
tries to find those who will go on to be the most successful. In the 
same way, it is also understandable that applicants seek to present 
themselves in the best possible way to a future employer. The situ-
ation only becomes problematic when some applicants distort their 
answers more than others, and as a result, the company no longer 
selects the most suitable applicants (e.g., Christiansen, Goffin, 
Johnston, & Rothstein, 1994; Donovan et al., 2014; Rosse, Stecher, 
Miller, & Levin, 1998). In this context, many authors suggest that 
the subjective perception of the competition for a job can have a 
considerable influence on individual faking (cf. Roulin et al., 2016; 
Tett & Simonet, 2011). However, considering our findings in relation 
to previous research efforts on competitive worldviews (Bourdage 
et al., 2018; Roulin & Bourdage, 2017; Roulin & Krings, 2016), it 
seems that competitive worldviews, as an aspect of this perception, 
play only a subordinate role in personality tests. It is precisely this 
finding that could have interesting consequences for the practical 
use of self-report procedures in the selection process. In our opin-
ion, competitive worldviews might be a strong predictor of applicant 
faking especially if the competitive nature of the situation is quite 
salient—if the applicants directly see that they are in competition 
with other applicants. If organizations wish to minimize the influence 
of competitive worldviews on the final selection decision, it might be 
a good idea to avoid such a situation as far as possible. In this context, 
online testing might have an advantage over group testing on site.
7.4 | Limitations
Two main limitations of the present study need to be mentioned. 
First and foremost, our study examined the phenomenon of fak-
ing in a lab setting and not with real applicants in a concrete se-
lection situation. Although study designs such as ours are one of 
the standard tools of faking research, some researchers (e.g., Ones 
et al., 1996) question the comparability of laboratory and field 
studies—a position that might also be supported by our own find-
ings (see the third paragraph of Contribution to Theory for a more 
detailed discussion).
Second, the participants in our samples are exclusively young 
people at the beginning of their working lives. We imposed this re-
striction deliberately because we considered this group of people 
to be particularly relevant to the context addressed in our study, as 
these individuals will all be applying for jobs and internships in the 
(near) future. Nevertheless, the question remains whether the cor-
responding results can be generalized to all age groups, especially 
given that some empirical studies suggest less faking among older 
workers (e.g., Ispas et al., 2014). It should also be mentioned here 
that we did not control for our participants’ prior knowledge about 
the job we used for our faking manipulation. As a certain amount of 
knowledge may be necessary to interpret the cues on the require-
ments of a job, the differences in participants’ cognitive abilities may 
not have been effective here. Although we have deliberately used a 
very generic faking manipulation without a job advertisement for a 
specific job to eliminate potential differences in participants’ knowl-
edge, this circumstance might be a reason for the lack of effects of 
cognitive abilities.
7.5 | Conclusion
The goal of this study was to examine the assumptions put forward 
in the recently presented dynamic model of faking behavior regard-
ing the relationship between competitive worldviews, cognitive 
abilities, and faking for the domain of personality testing. Despite 
three comprehensive laboratory samples and different operation-
alizations of the constructs, we were unable to reproduce the ef-
fects found in the context of job interviews. Moreover, in contrast 
to previous research findings, all participants in our samples showed 
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similarly pronounced faking behavior. This may lead to two possible 
conclusions: Either the applicants are less aware of the competitive 
situation in personality testing, meaning that competitive world-
views have little influence, or laboratory studies are less suitable to 
investigate factors influencing faking motivation due to their specific 
motivational character. Both options should be taken into account in 
future research.
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ENDNOTE S
 1 The Big Five dimensions of the corresponding results are indicated by 
their abbreviations. Conscientiousness = C; Emotional Stability = ES; 
Agreeableness = A; Extraversion = E; Openness to Experience = O; all 
Big Five Dimensions = ALL. 
2    The individual faking of participants (individual differences in personal-
ity scores between honest and applicant condition) varies in relation to 
the mean faking effect (mean difference between the two conditions). 
The higher the correlation between the personality scores from both 
conditions, the lower the variance of the individual faking. 2
   It applies:Var(f) =

















  Var(f) = variance in individual faking, Var(h) = variance in honest scores, 
Var(a) = variance in applicant scores Cov(h,a) = covariance between honest 
and applicant scores, r(h,a) = correlation between honest and applicant 
scores. 
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APPENDIX 
Item (German, English) Covered aspect
Die meisten Menschen…
Most people…
… sind der Meinung, dass der eigene Erfolg das einzige ist, das im Leben zählt.
… believe that their own success is the only thing that matters in life.
DA
… denken, dass es wichtig ist Macht zu besitzen.
… think that it is important to have power.
SDO
… nehmen Rücksicht auf andere Personen.
… show respect for other people.
TM (-)
… denken, dass der Zweck alle Mittel rechtfertigt.
… think that the end justifies all means.
MA
… sind dazu bereit ohne Gegenleistung zu helfen.
… are willing to help without receiving anything in return.
TM (-)
… würden Regeln brechen, um erfolgreich zu sein.
… would break rules to be successful.
MA
… halten einen Kompromiss für eine gute Lösung eines Streits.
… see a compromise as a good solution to a conflict.
DA (-)
… sind bereit andere Personen auszunutzen, um ihre Ziele zu erreichen.
… are willing to take advantage of others to achieve their goals.
MA
Notes: The abbreviations in the second column indicate the aspect of competitive worldviews construct covered by this item: DA, Darwinistic attitude; 
MA, Machiavellianism; SDO, social dominance orientation; TM, tough mindedness. Items with reversed polarity are additionally marked with (-).
TA B L E  A 1   Items of the competitive worldviews short scale developed for Sample 3
